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Abstract
A Markov switching DSGE model with ￿nancial frictions investi-
gates the e⁄ects of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) exit strate-
gies. Agents in the model have rational expectations about the prob-
ability of ￿nancial crises, the probability of a UMP response to crises,
and the exit strategy used. Selling o⁄ assets quickly produces a double-
dip recession; in contrast, a slow unwind generates a smooth recovery.
Increasing the probability of a UMP response to crises lowers pre-crisis
consumption. The welfare bene￿ts of increasing the probability of UMP
may di⁄er ex-ante versus ex-post, as can the preferred exit strategy.
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11 Introduction
In the fall of 2008, the US economy experienced a ￿nancial crisis, marked by
a deterioration in ￿nancial conditions along with a rapid slowing of real eco-
nomic activity. In response, the Federal Reserve expanded its purchases of
￿nancial assets, injecting additional capital into the economy. The increased
demand for ￿nancial assets provided by the Federal Reserve helped bolster
asset values and alleviate the pressure on ￿nancial institutions by lessening
the drop in the value of assets on their respective balance sheets. The Fed-
eral Reserve accomplished this expansion in asset purchases by instituting a
number of new lending facilities, such as expanding its purchases of mortgage
backed securities and commercial paper. This response is deemed "uncon-
ventional monetary policy" because of the wide range of assets purchased, in
contrast to "conventional monetary policy" which typically consists of pur-
chasing short-term Treasuries to manage short-term interest rates. In total,
the value of non-Treasuries assets held by the Federal Reserve reached over
$1.5 trillion. Figure 1 shows the sizeable increase in the total balance sheet,
the non-Treasuries portion of the balance sheet, and a measure of interest
rate spreads that jumped during the crisis, illustrating the increased level of
uncertainty.
An additional feature of the ￿nancial crisis and Federal Reserve￿ s balance
sheet expansion is that even after the crisis ended and interest rate spreads
decreased from their peak, the size of the balance sheet remained elevated. In
other words, the ￿nancial crisis triggered a start in unconventional monetary
policy, but the end of the crisis did not trigger an end in unconventional policy.
Rather than unwind its unconventional asset position as spreads decreased, the
Federal Reserve maintained its asset position past the end of the crisis, and
any exit strategy will be independent of the fall in spreads. Consequently, it
remains to be seen how the Federal Reserve will unwind the its balance sheet,
and what the e⁄ects of this unwind are for the macroeconomy.
In addition to the issue of exit strategy, given that the Federal Reserve
intervened with unconventional policy, one concern going forward is how ex-
2pectations about intervention policy during crises a⁄ect pre-crisis economic
behavior. If economic agents expect the central bank to intervene during
crises, this expectation may distort economic outcomes prior to a crisis occur-
ring. During the crisis, concerns about the potentially negative repercussions
of precedent-setting, such as reckless risk-taking, provided arguments against
using unconventional policy. Even if intervention policy bene￿ts the economy
during crises, if setting a precedent of intervention has negative e⁄ects during
non-crisis times, it may be a poor policy choice to set this precedent. On the
other hand, if expectations of intervention ease fears about small probability
events and allow credit to ￿ ow more freely, then setting a precedent may be
an entirely positive policy choice.
Considering of the e⁄ects of expectations along with the e⁄ects during crises
motivates an analysis of the welfare bene￿ts of intervention policy. The main
consideration with this welfare analysis is a form of time inconsistency: ex-ante
￿that is, before a crisis occurs ￿making intervention more likely could decrease
welfare, but ex-post ￿when a crisis occurs ￿making intervention more likely
could improve welfare. In addition, choosing an exit strategy may depend
upon the timing of the decision.
This paper addresses these questions about exit strategies, e⁄ects of pre-
crisis expectations, and welfare costs by building a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with a ￿nancial sector where ￿nancial crises occa-
sionally occur, and conditional on a crisis occurring, the central bank may or
may not intervene with unconventional policy. If the central bank does in-
tervene, it will not do so forever, but at some point it will unwind its balance
sheet, selling o⁄ its accumulated assets at a speci￿ed rate. Using Markov
regime switching, the model allows agents to have rational expectations about
transitions between regimes where the central bank intervenes and does not.
This framework allows the study of exit strategies after intervention occurs,
the e⁄ects of expectations on pre-crisis economic activity, and the welfare gain
or loss from di⁄erent policy expectations.
There has been a rapidly growing literature on the implications of ￿nancial
frictions in the macroeconomy. Many DSGE models, such as Christiano et al.
3(2005) and Smets & Wouters (2007), do not incorporate a ￿nancial sector,
and are therefore unable to explain movements associated with the banking
system. A standard framework to incorporate a ￿nancial sector is to use a
￿nancial accelerator model, as developed in Bernanke & Gertler (1989), Kiy-
otaki & Moore (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999), which allows for frictions
in the ￿nancial sector that slow the ￿ ow of funds from households to ￿rms.
Gertler & Karadi (2010) build upon the ￿nancial accelerator literature by in-
corporating a central bank equipped unconventional monetary policy during
crises, and show that intervention can lessen the magnitude of downturns as-
sociated with ￿nancial crises. Other models that allow for ￿nancial frictions
include Carlstrom (1997), Kiyotaki & Moore (2008), Brunnermeier & San-
nikov (2011), Christiano et al. (2010), and Perri & Quadrini (2011). Shleifer
& Vishny (2010), Cœrdia & Woodford (2010b), Cœrdia & Woodford (2010a),
Cœrdia & Woodford (2011), Del Negro et al. (2010), Angeloni et al. (2011),
Hilberg & Hollmayr (2011) consider government responses to crises or shocks
in the presence of ￿nancial frictions.
Many of the papers that consider government intervention during ￿nancial
crises lack the expectations and transitions between the intervention and no
intervention regimes that are included in this paper. When expectations and
transitions are ignored, any change in policy is entirely unexpected and consid-
ered permanent. Therefore, without the regime switching introduced in this
paper, the e⁄ects of exit strategies and pre-crisis expectations have to be ig-
nored as well. Following the rare event literature (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006),
Barro (2009), and Gourio (2010)), this paper allows ￿nancial crises to occur
with a small probability, and agents form expectations over the central bank￿ s
decision to intervene conditional upon that rare even occurring. However, as
in Barro et al. (2010), the model also allows crises to be persistent ￿that is, to
last several periods before ending ￿and studies the implications of uncertain
crisis duration. This uncertainty over crisis duration may have implications
for the magnitude of the drop in real activity: if agents are uncertain about
how long asset prices will remain suppressed, the economy may not rebound as
quickly as if agents know that the crisis will be brief. Bianchi (2011) consider
4the e⁄ects of pre-crisis macroprudential policies, and Chari & Kehoe (2009)
consider ex-ante versus ex-post incentives of government bailouts.
Many recent papers use Markov switching to model expectations over dis-
crete changes in government policy. Perhaps the most widely used appli-
cation considers changing conventional monetary policy rules, such as Davig
& Leeper (2007), Farmer et al. (2008), Farmer et al. (2009), and Bianchi
(2010). With Markov switching, expectations over future policy rules a⁄ect
current dynamics of the economy. For example, in conventional monetary
policy switching, expected changes in the in￿ ation target or response to in￿ a-
tion can a⁄ect current in￿ ation. In this paper, the probability of changing
to a regime where the central bank intervenes with unconventional policy can
a⁄ect pre-crisis dynamics, and expectations about exit strategies can a⁄ect
the initial portion of the crisis. Foerster et al. (2011) develop perturbation
methods for Markov switching models, which allow ￿ exibility in the modelling
of the regime switching and allow for second-order approximations, which are
important for welfare analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the model, with spe-
cial emphasis on the ￿nancial sector. Section 3 details how the parameters
of the economy change according to a Markov Process, and details the tran-
sitions between regimes. The response of the economy to crises with and
without intervention is discussed in Section 4, as are the e⁄ects of di⁄erent
exit strategies. Section 5 analyzes the e⁄ects of expectations of crisis poli-
cies on the pre-crisis economy. Section 6 discusses the welfare implications of
policy announcements, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the basic model, based on that developed in Gertler &
Karadi (2010). It is a standard DSGE model with the addition of a ￿nancial
sector, which serves as an intermediary between households and non￿nancial
￿rms. The next section describes the regime-switching in detail; this section
simply notes which parameters switch.
52.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of unit measure.
These households consume, supply labor, and save by lending money to ￿nan-
cial intermediaries or potentially to the government.
Each household is comprised of a fraction (1 ￿ f) of workers and a fraction
f of bankers. Each worker earns wages by supplying labor to non￿nancial
￿rms, and each banker owns a ￿nancial intermediary that returns its earnings
to the household. Bankers become workers with probability (1 ￿ ￿), so a total
fraction of (1 ￿ ￿)f transition to become workers; the same fraction transition
from being workers to being bankers, and the probability is independent of
duration. Upon exit, bankers transfer their accumulated net worth to the
household, and new bankers receive initial funds from the household. Within
the household, there is perfect consumption insurance.















where E0 is the conditional expectations operator, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount
factor, Ct is household consumption at time t, h controls the degree of habit
formation in consumption, Lt is household labor supply, { controls the disu-
tility of labor, and ’ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Households earn income from workers earning a wage Wt on their labor
supplied Lt, they receive an amount ￿t of net pro￿ts from ￿nancial and non￿-
nancial ￿rms, which equals pro￿ts and banker earnings returned to the house-
hold from exiting bankers less some start-up funds for new bankers, and they
receive lump sum transfers Tt. Households save by purchasing bonds Bt either
from ￿nancial intermediaries or the government, these bonds pay a gross real
return of Rt in period t+1. In equilibrium, both sources of bonds are riskless
and hence identical from the household￿ s perspective, so Rt is the risk-free rate
of return. Households then have income Rt￿1Bt￿1 from bonds. Consequently,
6the household￿ s budget constraint is given by
Ct + Bt = WtLt + ￿t + Tt + Rt￿1Bt￿1. (2)
Using a multiplier %t on (2), the household￿ s optimality conditions are
(Ct ￿ hCt￿1)
￿1 ￿ ￿hEt (Ct+1 ￿ hCt)







t = %tWt; (5)
which are for the marginal utility of conumption, bonds, and disutility of labor.
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries channel funds between the households and non￿nan-
cial ￿rms. Financial intermediaries, indexed by j, accumulate net worth Nj;t
and collect deposits from households Bj;t. Using these two sources of funding,
they purchase claims on non-￿nancial ￿rms Sj;t at relative price Qt. The
intermediaries￿balance sheets require that the overall value of claims on non-
￿nancial ￿rms equals the value of the intermediaries net worth plus deposits:
QtSj;t = Nj;t + Bj;t. (6)
In period t + 1 households￿deposits made at time t pay a risk-free rate
Rt. The claims on non-￿nancial ￿rms purchased at time t, pay out at t + 1
a stochastic return of Rk
t+1. The evolution of net worth is the di⁄erence in
interest received from non-￿nancial ￿rms and interest paid out to depositors:
Nj;t+1 = R
k






QtSj;t + RtNj;t. (7)
Hence, the intermediary￿ s net worth will grow at the risk-free rate, with any






Faster growth in net worth therefore must come from higher realized interest
7rate spreads Rk
t+1 ￿ Rt or an expansion of assets QtSj;t.
Since the evolution in net worth depends on the interest rate spread, a
banker will not fund assets if the discounted cost of borrowing exceeds the









￿ 0, for i ￿ 0; (8)
where ￿
i+1 %t+1+i
%t is the stochastic discount factor applied to returns in period
t+1+ i. The inequality is a key aspect of the model with ￿nancial frictions:
without constrained ￿nancial intermediaries the participation constraint ex-
actly binds by no arbitrage. In a model with ￿nancial frictions, ￿nancial
intermediaries may be unable to take advantage of positive expected interest
rate spreads due to borrowing or leverage constraints.
Each period bankers exit the ￿nancial intermediary sector and become
standard workers with probability (1 ￿ ￿). This probability limits the lifespan
of bankers, eliminating their ability to accumulate net worth without bound.
If the participation constraint (8) holds, a banker will attempt to accumulate
as much net worth as possible upon exit. The banker￿ s objective function
is to maximize the present value of their net worth at exit. The expected
discounted terminal net worth is then























This expression shows that, following from the expression (7) describing growth
in net worth, the value of being a ￿nancial intermediary is increasing in ex-





, future asset levels Qt+iSj;t+i,
and the risk-free return on net worth.
Expected terminal net worth depends on a banker￿ s current position by
Vj;t = vtQtSj;t + ￿tNj;t; (10)









































, and the risk free rate Rt, implying that expecta-
tions about future interest rates a⁄ect bankers￿expected terminal net worth.





is positive, ￿nancial intermediaries want to expand their assets in￿nitely by
borrowing additional funds from the household. To eliminate this possibility,
there is a friction that allows, in each period, a banker to divert a fraction ￿
of its assets QtSj;t back to the household, in which case depositors recover the
remaining fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of assets. Consequently, the incentive constraint
for the banker requires that the expected value of not diverting to exceed the
value of diverting funds:
Vj;t ￿ ￿QtSj;t: (13)
The constraint (13) binds so long as ￿ > vt, which implies that marginal
increases in assets have more bene￿t to the banker being diverted than as an
increase in expected terminal wealth. For the purposes of this paper, this
constraint will always bind, which implies, using (10) with (13), that assets
are a function of net worth by




denotes the leverage ratio of the ￿nancial intermediary. Since the price Qt
and the leverage ratio ￿t are independent of banker-speci￿c characteristics,
total intermediary demand is a result of summing over all independent inter-
9mediaries j:
QtSI;t = ￿tNt: (15)
So the total value of intermediated assets QtSI;t is equal to the economy￿ s
leverage ratio ￿t times aggregate intermediary net worth Nt. The key feature
of this expression is that the total amount of assets supplied by the ￿nancial
intermediaries is in part determined by their net worth. During ￿nancial
crises, sharp declines in ￿nancial intermediary net worth limit the amount of
assets the sector can provide for the economy.
Total net worth Nt equals that of existing Ne;t plus new bankers Nn;t. Since
bankers exit with probability (1 ￿ ￿), existing banker net worth makes up a










In every period, a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of bankers exit and become workers, trans-
ferring their accumulated net worth to the household. At the same time, an
identical measure of workers become bankers, and receive an initial level of net
worth from the household. Speci￿cally, new bankers receive start-up funds
equal to a fraction !




(1 ￿ ￿)QtSt￿1 = !QtSt￿1 (17)









Nt￿1 + !QtSt￿1. (18)
2.3 Government Assets
The previous section discussed the ￿nancial intermediary sector, and how
bankers use their net worth and borrowing from households to purchase claims
on non￿nancial ￿rms. Now consider that sometimes the central bank may bor-
row funds from households and purchase assets. In particular, the government
owns claims Sg;t on non￿nancial ￿rms at relative price Qt, for a total value of
10QtSg;t. Since QtSI;t is the total value of privately intermediated assets, the
total value of all assets in the economy is QtSt, where
QtSt = QtSI;t + QtSg;t. (19)
The central bank purchases these assets in a manner similar to private
￿nancial intermediaries: by issuing debt to households Bg;t at time t that pays
the risk free rate Rt in period t + 1. In addition, the central bank￿ s claims
on non￿nancial ￿rms earn the stochastic rate Rk
t+1 in period t + 1. The






Unlike private ￿nancial intermediaries, which are balance sheet constrained
because of the constant opportunity to divert a fraction ￿ of their assets, the
government does not face a similar moral hazard problem ￿it always repays
its debts. Consequently, the central bank faces no constraints on its balance
sheet, it can borrow and lend without limit. However, for every unit of assets
that the central bank owns, it pays a resource cost of ￿. This resource cost
captures any possible ine¢ ciencies from government intervention.
The government￿ s policy rule, discussed in Section 2.7, sets a fraction  t
of total intermediated assets. That is, it sets its purchases such that
QtSg;t =  tQtSt. (20)
To characterize the full leverage ratio of the economy, ￿rst note that using the
government share (20) and the private intermediaries￿total demand (15) in
the decomposition of total assets (19) yields
QtSt = ￿tNt +  tQtSt.







1 ￿  t
(21)
is the total leverage ratio for the economy. By setting  t, the central bank
11manipulates the total leverage ratio ￿
c
t. If the central bank increases its
fraction of supplied assets given a ￿xed private leverage ratio, the total leverage
ratio increases at an increasing rate.
2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods ￿rms operate in a competitive environment, producing us-
ing capital and labor. Firms purchase capital by issuing claims St to ￿nancial
intermediaries or the government, and then use the funds from issuing those
claims to purchase capital for next period. After production, the ￿rm then
pays to repair its depreciated capital and sells its entire capital on the open
market. A unit of capital and claim have price Qt, so QtKt = QtSt.
Given a level of capital Kt￿1, the ￿rm decides on labor demand, which
pays wage Wt, and a capital utilization rate Ut, and produces the intermediate
good Y m







and sells this output at price P m
t . Firms are also subject to changes in a
capital quality measure ￿t which evolves according to the process
log￿t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (st)
￿
log￿m (st) + ￿￿ (st)log￿t￿1 (23)
where st indicates a hidden Markov state at time t. This Markov process
a⁄ects the mean of the process log￿m (st), and persistence around the mean
￿￿ (st). As in Merton (1973), the capital quality shock ￿t alters the e⁄ective
capital stock of the economy ￿tKt￿1 and thereby exogenously changes the value
of capital in the economy. A more detailed description of the Markov Process
is in Section 3.
The ￿rm faces no adjustment costs, so period-by-period the ￿rm chooses
its labor demand and capital utilization such that
Wt = P
m














where the depreciation rate satis￿es ￿
0 (Ut) > 1, ￿
00 (Ut) > 1, and ￿
00 (Ut)Ut=￿
0 (Ut) =














This last expression highlights how changes in the capital quality measure ￿t
produce exogenous changes in the return on capital.
2.5 Capital Producing Firms
Capital producers are competitive ￿rms that buy used capital from interme-
diate goods ￿rms, repair depreciated capital, build new capital, and sell it to
the intermediate goods ￿rms. Gross investment is the total change in capital
It = Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (Ut))￿tKt￿1 (27)
Net investment is gross investment less depreciation:
I
n
t = It ￿ ￿ (Ut)￿tKt￿1. (28)
Firms face quadratic adjustment costs on construction of new capital but not
























t + Iss, f (1) = f0 (1) = 0, and f00 (￿) = ￿i. The optimal choice












































Retail ￿rms repackage intermediate output Y m
t into di⁄erentiated products Yf;t
which they sell at price Pf;t, where f 2 [0;1] denotes di⁄erentiated products.











Consumers of the ￿nal good use cost minimization; standard optimality
conditions imply that demand for good f is a function of the relative price of







Since retail ￿rms repackage intermediate output, their marginal cost is P m
t .
Firms set their price according to Calvo pricing with indexation: a ￿rm can re-
optimize each period with probability (1 ￿ ￿), and with probability ￿ simply
index prices with respect to lagged in￿ ation and the parameter ￿. A ￿rm






















subject to demand. The optimal relative price ~ P ￿
t = P ￿

































Given Calvo pricing with indexation, the evolution of the price level satis￿es
































and intermediate output and ￿nal output are related by Y m
t = &tYt.
2.7 Government Policy
There are two aspects to government policy: standard monetary policy and the
unconventional policy rule. Conventional monetary policy sets the nominal














where rss is the steady state nominal rate, and ￿￿ and ￿y control responses to
the in￿ ation and output gap, respectively. The nominal and risk-free interest





The government sets its unconventional asset holding  t according to
 t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿  (st)
￿
 m (st) + ￿  (st) t￿1 (36)
where the mean of the process  m (st) and its persistence ￿  (st) change ac-
cording to a Markov Process to be discussed in Section 3.
Finally, the government has a ￿xed amount of spending G every period,
plus it must pay a resource cost ￿ on its assets. It ￿nances these via lump-
sum taxes and the return from its previously held assets. Consequently, the
government￿ s budget constraint is given by








The resource constraint requires that output be used for consumption, invest-
ment plus capital adjustment costs, and government spending including the
resource cost of intervention:










t + G + ￿ tQtKt (38)
and the economy wide evolution of capital is













re￿ ecting that capital quality shocks a⁄ect the accumulation of capital.
3 Regime Switching and Equilibrium
This section embeds the core model into a regime switching framework. Para-
meters in two equations switch according to a Markov process: the exogenous
process for capital quality (23) and the unconventional policy rule (36). The
next two subsections discuss the switching in these equations, and subsection
3.3 covers the calibration and solution method.
3.1 Markov Switching in the Capital Quality Process
The ￿rst switching equation is the exogenous process for capital quality (23):
log￿t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (st)
￿
log￿m (st) + ￿￿ (st)log￿t￿1.
The functional form allows for changes in the mean of the process through the
term ￿m (st); and changes in the persistence ￿￿ (st), where st denotes the state
of the Markov Process. Allowing for changes in the mean and the persistence
captures a wide variety of possible switching dynamics. As mentioned in
Section 2.4, changes in capital quality drive exogenous ￿ uctuations in the
value of capital, and signi￿cant declines generate a ￿nancial crisis.
16The two switching parameters ￿m (st) and ￿￿ (st) each take on two values,
and these values depend upon a common Markov process. Speci￿cally, the
values depend upon whether or not the economy is in a ￿nancial crisis. If the
economy is not in a ￿nancial crisis, then the mean of the process is ￿
n
m = 1,
and the persistence is 0 < ￿n
￿ < 1, where the superscript n denotes "no crisis."
With probability pc, the economy experiences a ￿nancial crisis, and the mean of
the process switches to a lower level ￿
c
m < 1, where the superscript c indicates
"crisis" and the persistence switches to ￿c
￿ = 0. With probability pe, the
economy exits the crisis and returns to the "no crisis" mean and persistence.
The dual change in parameters between non-crisis and crisis has two e⁄ects.
First, when the economy enters a crisis, the crisis mean ￿
c
m < 1 implies that
the capital quality measure decreases. The crisis persistence ￿c
￿ = 0 implies
that the capital quality jumps downward to the lower mean. Second, when
the economy leaves a crisis, the mean ￿
n
m = 1 implies that the capital quality
measure returns to its original level, but the persistence 0 < ￿n
￿ < 1 implies
a gradual reversion to this higher mean. These two features capture the
typically rapid entry into ￿nancial crises, with a quick transition to a low
capital quality, while after the crisis ends the economy takes time to return
back to its pre-crisis level.
The transition probabilities also assume an asymmetry between entering
into and exiting out of ￿nancial crises. The probability pc that a crisis occurs
is independent of the probability pe that the economy exits a crisis, and this
framework can incorporate a wide variety of timing assumptions. In, for
example, Gertler & Karadi (2010) or Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), crises are
zero probability events (pc = 0), and if a crisis occurs it is a one-period shock
(pe = 1). On the other hand, as in Gertler et al. (2010), crises could be
independent events (pc = 1 ￿ pe). Most importantly, the probabilities allow
agents to expect that crises can occur, and, if a crisis does occur, it can last
several quarters.
173.2 Markov Switching in Unconventional Policy
The second switching equation governs unconventional policy (36):
 t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿  (st)
￿
 m (st) + ￿  (st) t￿1
where again the Markov Switching a⁄ects the mean of the process  m (st) and
its persistence ￿  (st). While an independent Markov process controls the
exogenous process for capital quality, the unconventional policy rule depends
on a Markov process dependent upon the realization of the exogenous process.
This feature captures the fact that, when a crisis occurs, the central bank may
or may not intervene, but the onset of a crisis triggers the decision to intervene
or not. In other words, the central bank will never begin intervention without
a crisis. In addition, the central bank may continue to intervene beyond the
end of the crisis.
Prior to a crisis, the central bank sets the mean and persistence of its
intervention to  
n
m = 0 and 0 ￿ ￿n
  < 1, where the superscript n denotes "no
intervention." When a crisis occurs, which happens with probability pc, the
central bank intervenes with unconventional policy with probability pi, where i




 , respectively. If the central bank does intervene, it sets the
mean of the process to be 0 <  
i
m < 1 and persistence to be ￿i
  = 0. Once
the economy exits from the crisis, intervention stops with probability ps, and




The Markov switching speci￿cation implies that when the central bank
intervenes, it always does so by purchasing a fraction  
i
m of total assets. When
it does not intervene, it sets the mean to  
n
m = 0, but the persistence is
0 ￿ ￿n
  < 1. These values imply two features about the no intervention case.
First, if  t￿1 = 0, meaning the central bank previously had no assets, then it
will continue to have no assets. Second, if it does have assets, so  t￿1 > 0,
then it will continue to hold assets, but will be decreasing its balance sheet size
according to an AR process. Consequently, the parameter ￿n
  captures the exit
strategy after a crisis. If 0 < ￿n
  < 1, when the rule switches from intervention
18to no intervention, there will be a gradual unwind of the accumulated assets.
On the other hand, if ￿n
  = 0, then when the rule switches to no intervention,
then instantly  t = 0, meaning the central bank exits the asset market with
an immediate sell-o⁄.
3.3 Calibration and Model Solution
Based on the preceding discussion of the switching in the capital quality
process and the unconventional policy equation, there are four total regimes.
The ￿rst regime is "normal times" which has high capital quality and the cen-
tral bank either holds no assets or unwinds its assets. The second regime,
called "crisis without intervention," has low capital quality and the central
bank holds no assets or unwinds. The third regime, "crisis with interven-
tion," has low capital quality and the central bank actively holds assets. The
fourth regime, "post-crisis with intervention," has high capital quality and the
central bank actively holding assets. Table 1 summarizes the switching para-
meters across these regimes, and Table 2 shows the transition probabilities.
Table 3 shows the baseline calibration. Most of the parameters are stan-
dard in the literature, and follow estimates in Primiceri et al. (2006). The
transition probabilities and switching parameters introduced in this paper cap-
ture various aspects of the recent ￿nancial crisis. The unit of time is a quarter.
First, following Barro (2006), the probability of crises is pc = 0:005, implying a
two percent chance of a crisis per year. Motivated by Figure 1, which showed
interest rate spreads spiking to above 5% for seven months, the probability
of exiting a crisis is pe = 0:5, implying an expected duration of two quarters.
The probability of intervention pi and of intervention stopping ps will vary,
but the baseline calibration has ps = 1=18, which, along with the expected
crisis duration, implies a total duration of intervention of 20 months before
exit begins. Figure 1 shows that the Federal Reserve held unconventional
assets beyond the end of the crisis. Alternatively, the central bank could have
a shorter or longer expected holding duration of either 12 or 28 total months,
in which case ps = 1=10 or 1=26, respectively.
19Following Gertler & Karadi (2010) and Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010), among
others, the size of the ￿nancial crisis is a ￿ve percent loss in the e⁄ective




￿ = 0:66 to capture the persistence of the crisis. The magnitude of
intervention is  
i
m = 0:06, which again roughly corresponds to Gertler &
Karadi (2010) and the experience of the US economy. The baseline persistence
of intervention in the non-intervention regimes is ￿n
  = 0:99, which means that
when intervention ends, the central bank unwinds its assets very slowly. An
alternate calibration will consider the e⁄ects of ￿n
  = 0, in which the central
bank sells its stock of assets o⁄all at once. Lastly, the benchmark calibration
will set the resource cost of intervention at ￿ = 0, which implies no loss of
output generated by the central bank holding assets. The welfare calculations
of Section 6 will consider ￿ = 0:0008 and ￿ = 0:002.
The described Markov switching DSGE model is solved using the pertur-
bation method of Foerster et al. (2011), which has two important features.
First, the method introduces Markov Switching from ￿rst principles, which
in turn allows for a ￿ exible environment that includes switching that a⁄ects
the steady state of the economy. Given that the switching equations involve
switching means, the economy￿ s regime-speci￿c steady states will di⁄er, a fea-
ture perturbation handles easily. In addition, perturbation allows for second-
and higher-order approximations, which improve the ability to capture the
e⁄ects of expectations and for welfare calculations.
4 Crisis Responses and Exit Strategies
Having discussed the basic model and the nature of regime switching, this sec-
tion considers ￿nancial crises, the e⁄ects of intervention, and exit strategies.
Given the Markov switching transition, each regime has uncertain duration;
the following results describe a "typical" crisis. In these experiments, agents
know the probabilities fpc;pe;pi;psg that dictate the transitions in the econ-
omy. In a typical crisis, the realized durations equal the expected durations:
the crisis lasts 1=pe periods, and unwinding of intervention begins 1=ps peri-
20ods after the crisis ends. Given the baseline parameterization of pe = 0:5 and
ps = 1=18, then if the typical crisis begins at t = 0, it ends in t = 2, and
unwinding beings in t = 20.
4.1 Intervention Versus No Intervention
First, consider the e⁄ects of a crisis under a guarantee of intervention (pi = 1)
versus no intervention (pi = 0). With guaranteed no intervention, the econ-
omy is in the "normal times" regime for t < 0, experiences a crisis in period
t = 0 when it automatically moves to "crisis without intervention" regime,
and then at t = 2 the crisis ends and the economy moves back to the "normal
times" regime. With guaranteed intervention, the economy is in the "normal
times" regime for t < 0, and when a crisis occurs at t = 0 it moves automati-
cally to the "crisis with intervention regime." Then, at t = 2, the crisis ends
and the economy moves to the "post-crisis with intervention" regime, where
it stays until t = 20, at which time it switches to the "normal times" regime
and the intervention is unwound.
Figure 2 depicts the responses to the typical crisis with pi = 0 and pi = 1.
When a crisis occurs, capital quality drops ￿ve percent for the duration of the
crisis ￿two periods in this case ￿and then returns to its pre-crisis levels. When
pi = 0, the level of intervention remains at zero. The shock to capital quality
reduces banker net worth, driving the leverage ratio up, and causing a drop
in the price of capital, which creates a ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect of further
diminishing the banker net worth. Since the ￿nancial intermediaries have less
net worth, they are unable to borrow funds, driving interest rates down and
spreads up, and capital declines with less investment. The increase in spreads
lasts two quarters before declining, roughly corresponding to the recent crisis
in the US, and in contrast to the one-period spike in spreads generated by a
one-period shock. In total, the drop in output exceeds 10% from its pre-crisis
level.
When pi = 1, the crisis is met by a jump in the level of intervention, which
continues for 20 quarters beyond the initial crisis. The additional demand
21for capital provided by the central bank in this circumstance works against
the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect: the price of capital drops slightly less, leading
banker net worth to drop slightly less, and the leverage ratio and interest rate
spreads to increase less than without intervention. The increased ability of
the private sector to provide capital, as well as that provided by the central
bank, yields a trough in output that is less than 9% of its pre-crisis levels. So
intervention lessens the recession by about 2 percentage points. At t = 20,
the central bank begins to unwind, and does so very gradually, since ￿n
  = 0:99
in this case, leading to a smooth, albeit slow, transition of the economy back
to its pre-crisis levels.
4.2 Exit Strategies
Suppose now that intervention is guaranteed (pi = 1), but that the unwind rate
after intervention ends di⁄ers. When the unwind rate is slow
￿
￿n
  = 0:99
￿
, the
results comparing intervention versus no intervention showed that the economy
transitions slowly but smoothly back to its pre-crisis level. Figure 3 shows the
e⁄ects of this slow unwind contrasted with the case of a sell-o⁄
￿
￿n
  = 0
￿
. With
a sell-o⁄, the intervention response is identical to the slow unwind case for the
intervention period, but at t = 20, when the economy switches back to the
"normal times" regime, the central bank immediately unloads its asset holdings
rather then unwinding them over an extended period. There are two main
implications of this sell-o⁄: contemporaneous to the sell-o⁄ and beforehand
through expectations.
When the sell-o⁄ occurs at t = 20, the central bank unloading its assets
immediately is e⁄ectively a ￿re sale of assets, which depresses the price of
capital. The decline in the price of capital diminishes the net worth of bankers,
leading to a decline in interest rates, and a jump in the private leverage ratio
and the interest rate spread. Since the central bank no longer provides capital
and the loss in net worth decreases the private sector￿ s ability to do so, the
rebound in capital slows from a loss in investment, and output drops again,
approximately two percentage points. Importantly, all of these responses
22are similar to what occurred during the initial crisis, except that at t = 20
capital quality has fully recovered. In other words, the sell-o⁄creates a second
￿nancial crisis and there is a double-dip recession due exclusively to policy.
The second e⁄ect of the policy di⁄erence is through expectations. The
slow unwind and sell-o⁄ policies are identical during the intervention regimes,
they only di⁄er once unwind begins. However, expectations of the sell-o⁄
versus the slow unwind matter during this period when policies are identical.
When agents in the economy expect a sell-o⁄ to occur at some future date,
they must worry about the crisis but also the double-dip recession. In fact,
given household consumption smoothing through habits, they have a stronger
incentive to provide more labor and save to smooth consumption through the
ensuing double dip. As a consequence, the intial loss in capital when the
sell-o⁄ is expected is not as dramatic as when the slow unwind is expected,
banker net worth is lower, and the private leverage ratio is higher and spreads
lower during the intervening period. The initial drop in output from the crisis
is also slightly less, implying that, with the sell-o⁄policy, the initial downturn
is less severe, but the economy experiences a double-dip recession when the
central bank unloads its assets.
4.3 Holding Duration
Having discussed the fact that an exit strategy of an immediate sell-o⁄ pro-
duces slightly better a slightly better outcome through the expectations chan-
nel but creates a double-dip recession when the sell-o⁄ occurs, it is important
to consider the holding duration as well as the possibility for a sell-o⁄ that is
neither immediate but not very slow. Figure 4 shows the responses of output
to the baseline duration of 20 total quarters versus the alternatives of a shorter
or longer holding time, at 12 or 28 quarters, respectively. For each duration,
the ￿gure shows the responses to both the slow unwind
￿
￿n






  = 0
￿
previously considered, but also a fast unwind
￿
￿n
  = 0:5
￿
.
Changing the expected holding duration produces similar responses to the
baseline duration, but with di⁄erences in magnitude. For all durations, the
23slow unwind produces a gradual recovery in output to its pre-crisis level, and
the sell-o⁄ produces an initial drop that is not quite as large but generates a
double-dip recession when the central bank exits from its asset position. With
a shorter holding duration, the di⁄erence in the trough of output between the
slow unwind and sell-o⁄ is larger than for the baseline duration, re￿ ecting
the incentive for households to smooth consumption from habits described in
the previous subsection. The size of the double-dip recession decreases with
duration: selling-o⁄assets soon after the crisis with a still-weak economy leads
to larger negative e⁄ects. The sell-o⁄ after the longer holding duration still
produces the double-dip recession, however.
In addition to the change in duration, the fast unwind case is a mixture
between the slow unwind and the sell-o⁄ cases. With the fast unwind, the
central bank exits quickly, but not immediately. The result, for all three
expected durations, is a double-dip that is less immediate but has the same
size of trough. Consequently, selling o⁄ assets quickly does still produce a
double-dip recession, but a more gradual one that simply delays the recovery.
5 Pre-Crisis: E⁄ects of Expectations
The previous section focused on the e⁄ects of intervention and exit strategies
during crises, this section examines the e⁄ects of expectations of intervention
and exit strategies during non-crisis times. The Markov switching framework
established in Section 3 gives agents expectations that crises can occur, as well
as expectations about the probability of intervention by the central bank, and
the duration of intervention and exit strategy if intervention does occur. These
expectations a⁄ect prices and quantities before crises occur. Consequently,
this section examines how the stochastic steady state of the economy associated
with the "normal times" regime changes as the probability of intervention
conditional on a crisis increases from pi = 0 to pi = 1, and the implications of
the expected exit strategy.
Foerster et al. (2011) show that, in general, economies with Markov switch-
ing that a⁄ects the steady state of the economy are not certainty equivalent,
24which implies that the stochastic steady state associated with each regime de-
pends upon probability distributions across future regimes. In addition, the
perturbation method allows a second-order approximation to the solution, and
this higher-order expansion can provide more accurate descriptions of how the
stochastic steady state for each regime varies. An alternative explanation of
the "normal times" regime-conditional stochastic steady state is that it is the
average over a long simulation of the economy, where agents expect that crises
can occur and have certain expectations about intervention probabilities and
exits, but ex-post in the simulation no crises occur.
5.1 Changes in Pre-Crisis Stochastic Steady State
In the baseline parameterization, agents perceive the probability of crises to
be pc = 0:005, the exit probability to be pe = 0:5, and the probability of
stopping intervention to be ps = 1=18. Figure 5 shows the percent change in
the "normal times" stochastic steady state relative to a benchmark economy
where pc = 0, meaning agents do not expect crises, and hence expectations
about intervention policy are irrelevant.
Consider the baseline parameterization with pc = 0:005 but pi = 0, so
intervention policy is irrelevant and hence the slow unwind and sell-o⁄ cases
are identical. Moving from an economy where agents do not expect crises
(pc = 0), to one where they expect crises without intervention has two main
implications. Households, on the one hand, have an incentive to precautionary
save in order to smooth consumption during times of crises. In the stochastic
steady state, this incentive increases household savings, boosting up capital
accumulation and raising output and consumption. On the other hand, crises
bring poor interest rate realizations for bankers, who will supply more net
worth, have lower leverage, and consequently create a lower amount of capital
for the economy, leading to lower output and consumption. In the aggregate,
the latter of these e⁄ects dominates: the economy with crises has 0.75% lower
capital, 0.445% lower output, and 0.285% lower consumption than would be
realized in an economy that never experienced crises.
25Now, as pi increases from 0 to 1, agents expect intervention with a higher
probability. Since intervention dampens the e⁄ects of crises, increasing the
probability of intervention erodes household￿ s precautionary incentive, lower-
ing capital and output, but raises capital and output by favorable interest rate
conditions for bankers. In aggregate, as pi increases, consumption declines,
but capital and output increase if the sell-o⁄exit strategy is used, but decline
if the slow unwind is in place. Consumption also declines more for the slow
unwind case than the sell-o⁄, which, since a sell-o⁄ produces a double-dip
recession, gives more incentive for households to save and boost consumption.
5.2 Expectations and Habits
To highlight the impact of the opposing channels, households￿precautionary
savings versus bankers￿interest rates, and the e⁄ects of expectations of policy,
Figure 6 contrasts the change in the "normal times" stochastic steady state
that prevails under the baseline calibration with habits (h = 0:815) with that
of no habits (h = 0). In the no habits case, the households have signi￿cantly
lower incentive to precautionary save, since their smoothing motive is dimin-
ished. As a result, the no habits case has capital, output, and consumption
signi￿cantly lower, as the lack of precautionary motive lessens the buildup of
household savings. As the probability of intervention pi increases, the main
e⁄ect is to improve the expected spread, which, in equilibrium, leads to lower
leverage and higher banker net worth.
6 Welfare Calculations
Having considered the e⁄ects of policy announcements and expectations during
and before crises, this section turns to evaluating the overall welfare gains or
losses from di⁄erent policy announcements. In particular, Section 4 discussed
the fact that guaranteed intervention had bene￿ts relative to no intervention
during crises, since intervention helps bolster the economy and alleviate the
crisis. However, there was a slight trade-o⁄depending upon the exit strategy:
26the immediate sell-o⁄ case produced a slightly lower drop in output and con-
sumption, but upon exit, the economy experienced a double-dip recession. In
addition, in Section 5, the e⁄ects of increasing the probability of intervention
had negative e⁄ects on pre-crisis consumption. Since crises are rare events,
whether or not the continual loss in consumption caused by increasing the
chance of intervention outweighs the bene￿ts of intervention during the crises
is ultimately a welfare question.
Importantly, in addition to the probability of intervention and the exit
strategy considered, welfare costs will be a⁄ected by two factors. First, the
resource cost ￿ of central bank intermediation will matter for welfare in that, if
the cost is high, then a larger portion of output is lost, which may lower welfare.
Second, the timing of the calculation matters for welfare costs. Speci￿cally,
the household￿ s gain or loss in welfare from di⁄erent policies will depend upon
whether they are experiencing a crisis or not. In other words, the ex-ante
welfare costs measure the willingness to pay for intervention before a crisis,
while the ex-post welfare costs measure willingness to pay when a crisis occurs.
For ex-ante and ex-post welfare, the welfare measure used is the percentage
increase in expected lifetime consumption under guaranteed no intervention
that would make households indi⁄erent between the increase in consumption
and an policy of a given probability of intervention and exit strategy. Positive
welfare measures indicate that intervention is welfare-increasing, since house-
holds need additional consumption under the given speci￿cation to mimic pos-
itive intervention probabilities. Negative welfare measures then imply inter-
vention is welfare-decreasing, as households are willing to give up consumption
rather than have positive intervention probabilities.
A second-order expansion to the value function formulation of household
preferences (1) allows for accurate welfare measures that incorporate both the
e⁄ects of crises and the e⁄ects of expectations in generating di⁄erences in the
"normal times" stochastic steady state.
276.1 Welfare and the Resource Cost
Figure 7 depicts the change in the welfare measure as the resource cost ￿ and
the intervention probability pi change. The top panel shows the baseline case,
when ￿ = 0, which corresponds to no e¢ ciency loss from intermediation, the
second and third panels show ￿ = :0008 and ￿ = :002, respectively. Each
panel shows the welfare measure in consumption units for a given intervention
probability, both with the slow unwind
￿
￿n
  = :99
￿
and the fast sell-o⁄
￿
￿n
  = 0
￿
cases. In addition, they compare welfare when the economy is in the "normal
times" regime versus when the economy has experienced a crisis but before
realization of the intervention outcome.
The ￿rst panel shows that, when ￿ = 0, increases in intervention proba-
bility are welfare improving in both the crisis and pre-crisis scenarios. Since
there is no resource cost of intervention, and given the magnitude of drops in
output and consumption relative to the change in pre-crisis consumption, hav-
ing intervention is welfare improving. It is interesting to note that the slow
unwind exit strategy dominates the fast sell-o⁄ strategy in both ex-ante and
ex-post circumstances. Since the slow unwind tended to smooth output after
crises, this fact implies that agents place emphasis on avoiding the double-dip
recession that the sell-o⁄ can produce. In addition, conditional on an exit
strategy, the bene￿t from having positive intervention probability is higher
once a crisis occurs.
The second and third panels change the implications of intervention. In
the second panel, when ￿ = :0008, the results about the type of intervention
and timing change. For both types of exit strategy, the welfare bene￿ts of
increasing the intervention probability are negative when the economy is in
the "normal times" regime, and positive when the economy enters a crisis.
This case suggests that there may be a type of time-inconsistency in the opti-
mal intervention policy. Before a crisis, it households prefer no intervention
because of the distortions caused by this guarantee and the resource cost of in-
tervention, but when a crisis occurs, increasing the probability of intervention
is welfare improving. Further, conditional upon intervention, the welfare-
preferred exit strategy changes from preferring a sell-o⁄ ex-ante to preferring
28a slow unwind ex-post.
The third panel has ￿ = :002, when the welfare bene￿ts are negative for
all the cases, meaning increasing the probability of intervention is welfare
decreasing. This fact holds true regardless of the exit strategy used and the
timing. Further, the ex-post welfare losses are higher, and the losses are higher
when the exit strategy is to unwind assets slowly. Both of these results stem
from the relatively high resource cost of intervention: when intervention is
costly in terms of output, there is a welfare loss from intervention, especially
when a crisis occurs ￿because intervention is immediate ￿and welfare losses
are higher when the intervention takes longer to unwind.
The di⁄erent levels of the resource cost dictate which policy environment
is best from a welfare perspective. Importantly, under the ￿ = 0:0008 pa-
rameterization for both types of crises, the better rule in terms of welfare
changed ex-ante versus ex-post. Prior to a crisis occurring, positive inter-
vention probabilities are welfare decreasing, and the better rule is the fast
unwind, but when a crisis occurs positive probabilities are welfare increasing,
and the welfare preferred rule is the slow unwind. These changes between
the ex-ante versus ex-post welfare implications suggest that there may be a
time-inconsistency in optimal policy and hence commitment may be di¢ cult.
6.2 Welfare and Holding Duration
Figure 7 shows that the di⁄erences between the ex-ante and ex-post welfare
measures when ￿ = 0:0008 are fairly robust to holding duration. The ￿gure
uses ￿ = 0:0008, and now the probability of stopping varies from ps = 1=18
to the shorter holding duration ps = 1=10 and the longer duration ps = 1=26
considered in the crises responses of Figure 4. As noted previously, when the
expected duration is 20 quarters, then increasing the intervention probability
increases welfare ex-post, and the dominate exit strategy is the slow unwind;
whereas increase the probability decreases welfare ex-ante and the dominant
exit strategy is the sell-o⁄.
When the expected holding duration is increased to 28 quarters, the results
29hardly change. When the duration is shorter, at 12 quarters, the main di⁄er-
ence is the negativity of the ex-post sell-o⁄welfare measure. In this case, even
when a crisis is occurring, the economy is better o⁄ with no intervention than
with intervention, because the intervention period is so short and is followed
by a sell-o⁄ of assets that creates a double-dip recession. In other words,
agents would rather the central bank not intervene than intervene but exit
rapidly and after a short period.
7 Conclusion
This paper used a model of unconventional monetary policy along with regime
switching to study the e⁄ects of exit strategies and agents pre-crisis expecta-
tions. After intervention, if the central bank exits its unconventional policy
with a sell-o⁄, the economy experiences a double-dip recession. In addition,
increasing the probability of intervention during crises causes distortions in
pre-crisis activity by altering agents￿expectations; in particular, pre-crisis sto-
chastic steady state consumption falls as the intervention probability increases.
Finally, the welfare bene￿ts of increasing the probability of intervention can
raise or lower welfare, and that the timing of the welfare calculation matters
as well as the type of exit strategy used.
One interesting avenue for future research is make the probability and
magnitude of intervention endogenous and dependent on the extent of the
crisis. This paper assumed ￿xed crisis magnitudes, levels of intervention, and
probabilities. Larger crises presumably have a higher probability and levels
of intervention. In addition, the probability of crises is ￿xed and exogenous;
moral hazard could be captured in the model by having a state-dependent
probability of crisis. Since expectations about future intervention probabilities
and exit strategies a⁄ect the pre-crisis state, policy declarations could serve
to increase or decrease the probability of crises. Similarly, the probability the
central bank starts to unwind its balance sheet may depend upon how quickly
the economy rebounds after the crisis. Finally, this paper has focused on a
given class of policy, optimal policy within this class is left for future work.
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Table 1: Markov Switching Parameters
st ￿m (st) ￿￿ (st)  m (st) ￿  (st)
1) "Normal" 1 ￿n
￿ 0 ￿n
 
2) "Crisis without Intervention" ￿
c
m 0 0 ￿n
 
3) "Crisis with Intervention" ￿
c
m 0  
i
m 0




Table 2: Markov Switching Probabilities
st+1
1 2 3 4
1 1 ￿ pc pc (1 ￿ pi) pcpi 0
st 2 pe 1 ￿ pe 0 0
3 peps 0 1 ￿ pe pe (1 ￿ ps)
4 (1 ￿ pc)ps 0 pc (1 ￿ pc)(1 ￿ ps)
34Table 3: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Description Value
￿ Discount Factor 0.99
h Degree of Habit Persistence 0.815
{ Disutility of Labor 3.409
’ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor 0.276
￿ Divertable Fraction of Banker Assets 0.381
! Transfer to New Bankers 0.002
￿ Survival Rate of Bankers 0.972
￿ Capital Share 0.33
￿ U Steady State Capital Utilization 1.00
￿ ￿ Steady State Depreciation 0.025
￿ Elasticity of Depreciation to Utilization 7.2
￿i Inverse Elasticity of Net Invest. to Capital Price 1.728
" Elasticity of Substitution Between Final Goods 4.167
￿ Probability of No Optimization of Prices 0.779
￿ Degree of Price Indexation 0.241
￿ g Fraction of Steady State Output for Government 0.2
￿￿ Response of Interest Rate to In￿ ation 2.043
￿y Response of Interest Rate to Output Gap 0.5
pc Probability of a Crisis Occuring 0.005
pe Probability of Exiting a Crisis 0.5
ps Probability of Intervention Stopping 1/18
￿
c
m Capital Quality During Crises 0.95
￿n
￿ Capital Quality Persistence after Crises 0.66
 
i
m Central Bank Intervention Level 0.06
￿n
  Rate of Central Bank Exit 0.99
￿ Resource Cost of Intervention 0
35Figure 2: Responses Under a Guarantee
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36Figure 3: Exit Strategies: Slow Unwind versus Sell-O⁄
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37Figure 4: Output Responses to Holding Durations and Exit Strategies
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38Figure 5: E⁄ects of Expectations

















































































































































Figure 6: E⁄ects of Expectations and Impact of Habits
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39Figure 7: Welfare and the Resource Cost
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Figure 8: Welfare and Holding Duration
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